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The	Hidden	Seeds	of	Survival:		
Adorno	and	the	Life	of	Art	Are	artworks	alive?	It	is	necessary	to	specify,	first	of	all,	what	is	meant	by	this	question.	One	answer	to	it	might	wish	to	point	out,	cheerfully,	that	works	of	art	are	still	being	produced,	and	that	older	works	are	still	being	exhibited,	performed,	archived,	and	anthologised,	and	hence	still	have	an	audience,	a	public,	a	readership.	Art	is	alive	insofar	as	it	is	still	around	and,	moreover,	insofar	as	it	has	a	function	in	the	world	in	which	people	conduct	their	lives.	It	is	as	if	people	communicate	life	to	artworks	as	they	brush	up	against	them.	Something	like	this	would	be	the	answer	to	my	opening	question	proffered	by	the	cultural	functionary,	employed	to	affirm	that	art	is	not	only	alive,	but	well.	That,	however,	is	not	an	answer	to	the	question	meant	here.	Rather,	to	ask	‘are	artworks	alive?’	is	to	ask:	are	artworks	living	beings?	do	they	have	a	life	of	their	own	–	a	life,	moreover,	that	may	be	their	own	in	the	emphatic	sense	that	it	is	not	merely	an	‘as	if’	version	of	the	life	of	human	beings?	This	way	of	putting	the	question	invites,	perhaps,	some	puzzlement,	and	certainly	a	less	ready	response	–	less	ready	in	part	because	what	‘alive’	might	mean	here	is	not	immediately	obvious,	since	it	is	now	not	simply	a	more	vivid	term	for	‘current’	or	‘relevant’	or	‘plentiful’	or	‘unabating’,	but	less	ready	also	because	artworks	are	not	conspicuously	alive	in	the	way	that	human	beings	seem	to	be.	They	do	not	breathe	or	digest	or	have	any	of	the	other	signs	by	which	the	presence	of	life	is	routinely	determined.	And	yet,	these	deficiencies	notwithstanding,	may	we	nevertheless	think	that	artworks	are	alive?	One	way	to	address	this	version	of	the	question	might	be	to	have	recourse	to	analogy,	specifically	to	the	analogy	of	artworks	with	organic	forms,	whereby	they	can	be	said	to	be	alive	because	of	
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their	structural	similarity	with	organisms.	Compelling	as	this	way	of	thinking	has	proved	in	aesthetics	and	literary	theory	since	Romanticism,	it	is	surely	qualified	by	the	caveat	that	works	of	art	are	not,	on	such	an	account,	really	living	in	themselves,	but	rather	what	is	being	affirmed	is	that	their	genesis	is	substantially	comparable	to	that	of	things	that	are	really	living.			 I	want	in	this	essay	to	pursue	a	line	of	thinking	that	departs	from	both	of	these	ways	of	answering	my	opening	question.	I	want,	that	is,	to	trace	the	suggestion	that	art	has	life,	but	not	as	we	know	it,	in	the	thinking	of	Theodor	Adorno.	Adorno’s	frequent	recourse	to	the	suggestion	that	artworks	are	living	is	predicated	neither	on	the	kind	of	cultural	optimism	that	points	to	a	thriving	art-scene	(no	surprise	there),	nor	on	the	mere	analogy	of	artworks	to	things	more	routinely	acknowledged	as	living.	This	second	point	is	especially	significant.	That	artworks	might	be	said	to	share	certain	characteristics	with	beings	that	are	accepted	as	having	life	–	paradigmatically,	perhaps,	the	human	beings	that	create	and	behold	artworks,	but	also	natural	objects	–	cannot	serve	as	the	ground,	for	Adorno,	for	speaking	of	artworks	as	alive.	Crucially,	it	is	in	fact	no	longer	clear,	according	to	Adorno,	that	human	beings	are	unquestionably	alive.	This	is	a	leitmotif	of	Adorno’s	thinking	–	one	that	is	frequently	prompted	in	his	work,	incidentally,	in	connection	with	works	of	art1	–	and	it	has	specific	consequences	for	the	kind	of	existence	that	they	themselves	may	be	thought	to	have.	Crucially,	the	dissimilarity	of	artworks	to	human	life,	or,	rather,	to	what	passes	for	human	life,	is	the	condition	of	their	own	animacy.	Putting	it	this	way	round	–	rather	than	saying	that	the	life	of	artworks	is	not	human	–	is	essential	to	the	case	that	Adorno	wants	to	make.	However,	I	also	argue	that	by	denying	the	predication	of	art	life	on	human	life	Adorno	does	not	simply	sever	any	connection	between	art	and	
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humanity.	On	the	contrary,	art’s	non-human	life	intimates	what	I	might	tentatively	call	a	true	anthropomorphism.		 In	what	follows,	I	first	address	the	relation	between	‘living	experience’	and	the	life	of	the	artwork	in	Aesthetic	Theory,	since	the	account	of	this	relation	Adorno	develops	there	implicitly	concerns	the	suspicion	that	the	life	of	art	is	just	the	result	of	anthropomorphic	projection.	Having	established	that	the	life	of	art	cannot	confidently	be	ascribed	to	the	beholder	of	the	artwork,	I	examine	Adorno’s	claim	that	artworks	have	a	‘life	sui	generis’	(AT,	4)	not	predicated	upon	the	life	of	their	makers.	It	is	here	that	the	insistence	that	the	life	of	art	is	not	human	life	begins	fully	to	emerge.	Finally,	I	show	that	Adorno’s	conception	of	the	life	of	artworks	is	substantially	modelled	on	the	idea	of	resurrection:	on	the	idea,	that	is,	of	a	life	that	is	at	once	a	radical	transformation	and	recovery	of	a	life	that	has	gone	before.		 *	At	the	beginning	of	the	section	of	Aesthetic	Theory	explicitly	concerned	with	the	formulation	of	a	theory	of	the	artwork,	Adorno	addresses	the	question	of	aesthetic	experience	and	its	relation	to	the	object	in	terms,	specifically,	of	animacy	and	its	potential	sources.	In	doing	so,	he	continues	the	critique	of	the	enlightenment	assumption	that	animacy	is	mere	anthropomorphic	projection	that	he	and	Horkheimer	formulated	in	Dialectic	of	Enlightenment.	He	also	addresses	a	question	latent	in	any	attempt	to	argue	for	the	life	of	artworks:	just	because	the	experience	of	artworks	is	felt	to	be	animating,	why	should	that	entail	that	artworks	themselves	are	alive?	Adorno	gives	the	following	answer:	That	the	experience	of	artworks	is	adequate	only	as	living	experience	is	more	than	a	statement	about	the	relation	of	the	observer	to	the	observed,	more	than	a	statement	about	psychological	cathexis	as	a	condition	of	
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aesthetic	perception.	Aesthetic	experience	is	living	only	by	way	of	the	object,	in	that	instant	in	which	artworks	themselves	become	living	under	its	gaze.	[…]	Through	contemplative	immersion	the	immanent	processual	quality	of	the	work	is	set	free.	By	speaking,	it	becomes	something	that	moves	in	itself.	(AT,	175-76)2		The	possibility	suggested	here	that	there	is	a	kind	of	experience	that	is	not	living	is	of	course	central	to	the	whole	of	Adorno’s	philosophy.3	Adorno	does	not	view	the	life	of	art	as	a	straightforwardly	anthropomorphic	projection	because	he	does	not	prima	facie	accept	that	human	beings	as	they	are,	are	alive.	Though	this	supposition	has	long	been	recognised	as	crucial	to	Adorno’s	thinking,	it	is	nevertheless	worth	briefly	elaborating	its	contrarian	thrust	here,	since	one	is	perhaps	tempted	in	reading	the	epigraph	‘Life	does	not	live’	at	the	opening	of	
Minima	Moralia,	for	instance,	to	contend	that,	like	it	or	not,	human	beings	when	they	are	alive,	are	alive.	Adorno	insists	that	‘life’	is	a	more	ambiguous,	and	in	fact	more	deeply	riven	category,	than	might	be	suggested	by	the	assumption	that	it	is	determinable	by	taking	a	pulse.	Life	means	more	than	life.4	For	instance,	Proust’s	
À	la	recherche	du	temps	perdu	(a	work	to	which	we	will	have	cause	to	return	below)	is	described	by	Adorno	as	‘an	appeal	at	law	filed	by	life	against	life’,	a	description	that	seeks	to	evoke	Proust’s	attempt	to	resist	accepted	wisdom	and	to	recover	instead	experience	as	it	occurred.5	The	process	of	coming	to	an	acceptance	of	universally	acknowledged	wisdom	–	the	accumulation	of	experience,	the	gradual,	unnoticed	attenuation	of	unrealistic	ideals,	the	recognition	that	there	is	nothing	more	to	‘life’	than	its	own	course	–	might	be	one	definition	of	‘life’;	the	recovery	of	a	quite	different	kind	of	experience,	of	unexpected	innervation,	might	be	another.		
	 5	
	 All	the	more	emphatic	than	the	above	description	of	Proust’s	novel,	however,	is	Adorno’s	critique	in	Negative	Dialectics	of	the	philosophical	fetishization	of	life	itself	in	its	apparently	most	basic	instantiations:	The	less	of	life	remains,	the	greater	the	temptation	for	our	consciousness	to	take	the	sparse	and	abrupt	living	remnants	for	the	phenomenal	absolute.		 Even	so,	nothing	could	be	experienced	as	truly	alive	if	something	that	transcends	life	were	not	promised	also;	no	straining	of	the	concept	leads	beyond	that.6		Turning	on	its	head	the	consoling	apothegm	that	where	there’s	life,	there’s	hope,	Adorno	insists	that	only	where	there	is	hope,	is	there	life.	This	statement	of	the	necessity	to	life	of	something	beyond	what	it	currently	is,	and	concomitantly	of	the	falsity	of	clinging	to	the	putative	remnants	of	life	once	all	promise	has	been	eliminated	from	it,	emerges	from	Adorno’s	claim	that	implicit	to	Alban	Berg’s	music	is	the	question,	‘Can	this	be	all?’	Music,	in	fact,	seems	particularly	to	express	this	sense	that	life	is	irreducible	to	sheer	immediacy.	Quite	how	radically	Adorno	intends	his	contention	that	life	without	promise	cannot	be	‘experienced	as	truly	alive’	is	suggested	in	his	book	on	Mahler,	where	he	refers	to	the	affirmation	of	the	possible	as	‘the	promise	without	which	breath	could	not	for	a	second	be	drawn.’7	Mahler	is,	for	Adorno,	the	artist	par	excellence	of	this	realisation.	Acknowledging	that	Mahler	could	hardly	‘escape	the	concept	of	“Life”’	given	its	prominence	in	the	vitalistic	enthusiasm	of	his	time,	Adorno	nevertheless	distinguishes	Mahler’s	violation	of	accepted	standards	of	technical	mastery	with	Strauss’s	expertise	in	terms	of	their	different	relation	to	‘life’.	Strauss’s	music	is	characterised	by	‘the	affirmative	echo	of	vitalism’,	whereas	Mahler	‘resembles	the	metaphysical	philosophies	that	reflected	the	idea	of	life,	Bergson	and	the	late	Simmel.’	In	particular,	Adorno	goes	on,	‘Simmel’s	formula	of	life	as	more	than	life	does	not	sit	ill	on	Mahler.’	(Mahler,	133)8	This	does	not	
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mean	that	Mahler’s	music	is	merely	an	expression	of	a	philosophical	position	–	it	would	be	ludicrous	to	try	to	determine	whether	Bergson	and	Simmel	were	in	some	way	the	sources	of	Mahler’s	music	and	hence	its	privileged	explicans.	Rather,	it	is	the	strictly	musical	characteristic	of	Mahler’s	work,	his	tendency	to	be	drawn	by	the	direction	latent	in	his	music,	as	opposed	to	the	exercise	of	Straussian	mastery,	that	autonomously	echoes	Simmel’s	conception	of	life	being	irreducible	to	sheer	vitality.	The	life	of	Mahler’s	music	is	not	in	gratification,	not	in	the	exercise	of	vital	force,	but	in	its	restless	development	beyond	itself.						 We	will	return	to	Mahler	–	and	to	Mahlerian	duration	in	particular	–	below.	But	for	now	it	should	be	emphasised	that	for	Adorno	life	is	such	that	it	is	not	reducible	to	itself.	There	is	no	basic	life.	Or	put	another	way,	life	reduced	to	its	bases	is	not	life	in	its	purest,	unadulterated	form,	but	rather	a	shadow	of	what	it	might	fully	be.	This	is	a	‘life’	that	is	called	‘life’	precisely	because	any	sense	of	what	‘life’	might	be	capable	of	becoming	has	been	lost.	The	assertion	that	there	is	no	breathing	without	promise	is	thus,	for	Adorno,	no	exaggeration,	and	indeed	it	combines	with	the	fact	that	in	Negative	Dialectics	the	question	of	the	point	of	life	is	put	into	the	mouth	of	‘a	desperate	man	who	wants	to	kill	himself’	(ND,	376).	No	distinction	between	literal	and	metaphorical,	bare	and	biographical	life	is	finally	operative	here.	The	withdrawal	of	the	promise	of	possibility	tends	to	the	extinction	of	life,	not	its	recognition	as	phenomenologically	absolute.		 This	detour	into	Adorno’s	critique	of	human	life	as	it	is	and	its	assumed	meaningfulness	is	necessary	because	it	is	implied	in	that	critique	that	humans	are	disqualified	from	bestowing	life	on	other	things,	including	works	of	art.	A	being	whose	own	life	is	open	to	question	–	a	questioning	that	already	reveals	life’s	opposition	to	itself,	since	‘[a]	life	that	had	any	point	would	not	need	to	
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inquire	about	it’	(ND,	377)	–	cannot	ascribe	life	to	anything	else.	Hence,	the	systematic	connection,	as	it	were,	between	Adorno’s	scepticism	concerning	human	life	and	his	abiding	sense	that	artworks	are	living	inheres	in	the	fact	that	our	derangement	concerning	life	entails	that	things	whose	putative	life	is	in	no	way	comparable	to	ours	might	turn	out	to	intimate	the	kind	of	life	that	we	ought	to	have.	Furthermore,	the	passage	concerning	the	relation	of	living	experience	and	the	life	of	the	artwork	from	Aesthetic	Theory	above	short-circuits	the	transferral	of	animacy	from	observer	to	artwork	–	or,	for	that	matter,	vice	versa.	The	object	is	responsible	for	rendering	aesthetic	experience	living.	But	at	the	same	time	the	object	itself	becomes	animate	only	under	the	gaze	of	aesthetic	experience.9	Much	experience	of	artworks	is	procedural,	reliant	upon	the	academically	sanctioned	and	‘fully	backed-up’	processing	of	an	object	according	to	historical,	philological,	and	other	schema.10	In	such	a	case,	the	observer’s	mastery	of	the	object	is	just	as	fatal	to	the	life	of	her	or	his	experience	of	it	as	it	is	to	the	object	under	scrutiny.	Freedom	from	officially	sanctioned	critical	procedure	is	freedom	for	both	the	object	and	the	observer,	even	if	the	latter’s	freedom	is	paradoxically	won	via	submission	to	former.	The	object	is	alive	because	under	such	conditions	aesthetic	experience	arises	thanks	to	the	object’s	activity	–	an	activity	prompted	by	the	observer’s	immersion	within	it.	That	moment,	for	example,	at	which	a	remembered	line	of	verse	becomes	luminous	–	perhaps	in	unexpected	or	even	inconvenient	circumstances	–	is	the	moment	at	which	aesthetic	experience	becomes	living,	but	it	is	living	thanks	to	the	uncontrolled	activity	of	the	line	itself	in	memory.	According	to	Adorno,	art	thus	participates	in	enlightenment’s	mortification	of	the	world	and	in	its	dialectic.	The	artwork	both	confirms	enlightenment’s	thesis	about	anthropomorphism	–	the	
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life	of	the	artwork	is	contingent	upon	our	engagement	with	it	–	and	at	the	same	time	discounts	that	thesis	–	even	what	human	beings	make	comes	to	have	a	life	of	its	own	that	we	cannot	fully	account	for.	Encounter	with	artworks	is	not	one	in	which	the	artwork	is	invested	with	properties	otherwise	wholly	absent	from	it,	or	submitted	to	the	techniques	of	academically	sanctioned	critical	strictures,	but	rather	one	characterised	by	an	animated	passivity	on	the	part	of	the	beholder	in	relation	to	what	becomes	animate	in	its	very	recognition	as	such.11			 Adorno	is	thus	acutely	aware	of	the	need	to	address	the	suspicion	that	the	animacy	of	art	is	the	result	of	mere	psychological	cathexis.	This	is	a	delicate	task,	since	he	also	wishes	to	give	due	prominence	to	the	role	of	experience,	not	just	in	aesthetics	in	general,	but	in	the	constitution	of	the	work	of	art	itself	in	particular.	His	most	important	attempt	to	deal	with	the	questions	that	arise	from	this	attempt	is	in	his	essay	‘Valéry	Proust	Museum’,	where	he	pits	two	of	the	most	important	thinkers	not	just	for	the	understanding	of	artworks,	but	for	the	understanding	of	artworks	as	in	some	sense	living,	against	one	another.	Though	commentary	on	this	essay	has	not	usually	emphasised	this	aspect	of	the	controversy	Adorno	establishes	between	them,	what	it	is	for	an	artwork	to	live	is,	as	we	will	see,	the	central	disagreement	between	Marcel	Proust	and	Paul	Valéry.12	The	essay,	however,	begins	with	death:	The	German	word,	‘museal’,	has	unpleasant	overtones.	It	describes	objects	to	which	the	observer	no	longer	has	a	vital	relationship	and	which	are	in	the	process	of	dying.	They	owe	their	preservation	more	to	historical	respect	than	to	the	needs	of	the	present.13		It	is	Valéry	who	is	in	sympathy	with	this	sense	that	museums	are	the	mortuaries	of	dead	culture.	The	lost	connection	between	the	works	housed	in	them	and	‘the	immediacy	of	life’	is,	for	Valéry,	fatal	to	art	(VPM,	180).	For	Proust,	on	the	
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contrary,	it	is	only	in	the	context	of	the	museum	that	an	artwork,	severed	from	its	functional	context,	comes	into	its	‘true	spontaneity’,	which	is	registered	in	its	profound	effect	on	the	individual	observer	(VPM,	181).	What	Valéry	and	Proust	advance	are	two	different	views	of	the	life	of	art	–	if	not,	in	fact,	of	life	itself.	The	realisation	to	which	Valéry	comes	is	that	the	curation	of	artworks	in	museums	effectively	amputates	them,	separating	them	from	the	organism	upon	which	they	depend	for	survival.	They	are	reified	and	neutralized.	Life	for	Valéry	is	usefulness,	effectiveness,	function	–	a	conclusion	at	which	he	arrives	not	by	way	of	the	belief	that	art	should	a	priori	be	engaged	or	committed,	but	through	the	discovery	that	‘the	only	pure	works,	the	only	works	that	can	sustain	serious	observation,	are	the	impure	ones	which	do	not	exhaust	themselves	in	that	observation	but	point	beyond,	towards	a	social	context.’	(VPM,	180)	Life	for	Proust,	on	the	contrary,	is	innervation,	stimulation	of	the	observer’s	consciousness.	As	such,	Proust	is	concerned	not	with	the	life	that	art	once	had	in	a	functional	context	–	a	life-world,	we	might	say	–	from	which	it	has	been	excised,	but	with	its	second	life,	its	afterlife	–	a	life	that	is	not	a	continuation	of	its	former	life,	but	a	departure	from	it.14			 As	readers	of	Adorno	might	expect,	the	dispute	between	Valéry	and	Proust	is	not	adjudicated	by	coming	down	on	one	side	or	the	other,	but	by	noting	that	a	particular	conception	of	art	emerges	between	the	two	writers	–	where	‘between’	is	not	some	beige	mean,	but	the	point	at	which	both	theories	pass	over	into	each	other.	It	is	at	this	point,	that	is,	that	we	can	begin	to	see	the	importance	to	Adorno	of	refusing	to	model	art	life	on	human	life.		What	Adorno	praises	in	Valéry,	in	opposition	to	Proust,	is	his	insistence	that	art	is	not	ultimately	referable	to	the	observing	subject.	‘Few	things	have	contributed	so	greatly	to	
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dehumanization	as	has	the	universal	human	belief	that	products	of	the	mind	are	justified	only	in	so	far	as	they	exist	for	men’	(VPM,	182).	We	will	return	to	the	way	that	Valéry’s	anti-humanism	holds	out	the	promise	of	a	true	humanism.	But	it	must	first	be	noted	that	Proust	is	not	simply	blamed	for	his	ultimate	reference	of	artworks	to	the	pleasure	of	human	observers,	rather	than	to	their	role	within	a	human	functional	context:	Works	of	art	can	fully	embody	the	promesse	du	bonheur	only	when	they	have	been	uprooted	from	their	native	soil	and	have	set	out	along	the	path	to	their	own	destruction.	Proust	recognized	this.	The	procedure	which	today	relegates	every	work	of	art	to	the	museum,	even	Picasso’s	most	recent	sculpture,	is	irreversible.	It	is	not	solely	reprehensible,	however,	for	it	presages	a	situation	in	which	art,	having	completed	its	estrangement	from	human	ends,	returns,	in	Novalis’	words,	to	life.	(VPM,	185)		 	Commenting	on	the	famous	opening	scene	of	La	Côté	de	chez	Swann,	in	which	the	narrator	recalls	slipping	into	sleep	as	a	child	and	thereby	seemingly	becoming	whatever	the	topic	of	his	bedtime	reading	was,	Adorno	remarks	that	‘[t]his	is	the	reconciliation	of	that	split	which	Valéry	so	irreconcilably	laments.	The	chaos	of	cultural	goods	fades	into	the	bliss	of	the	child	whose	body	feels	itself	at	one	with	the	nimbus	of	distance.’	(VPM,	185)		 The	point	I	want	to	draw	from	this,	however,	is	less	that	Proust’s	and	Valéry’s	positions	‘pass[	]	over	into	one	another’	(VPM,	183),	and	more	that	Adorno’s	avowal	of	the	life	of	artworks	is	predicated	upon	a	fundamental	uncertainty	about	human	beings	–	the	uncertainty	as	to	whether	it	is	really	they	who	are	alive	any	more.	Scepticism	concerning	the	human	as	a	privileged	source	of	life	is,	of	course,	a	key	motif	in	Adorno’s	thinking.	Against	such	a	background,	seeking	solace	in	non-human	objects	can	no	longer	be	dismissed	as	a	reifying	denial	of	the	vivid	pulse	of	human	life	in	all	its	gaiety	and	wealth.	In	an	affecting	essay	on	the	mentor	of	his	youth,	Siegfried	Kracauer,	Adorno	notes	an	absence	in	
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Kracauer’s	thought	that	might	otherwise	have	drawn	censure	as	a	serious	intellectual	omission:		One	looks	in	vain	in	the	storehouse	of	Kracauer’s	intellectual	motifs	[Motivschatz]	for	indignation	about	reification.	To	a	consciousness	that	suspects	it	has	been	abandoned	by	human	beings,	objects	are	superior.	In	them	thought	makes	reparation	for	what	human	beings	have	done	to	the	living.	The	state	of	innocence	would	be	the	condition	of	needy	objects,	shabby,	despised	objects	alienated	from	their	purposes.15		It	is	not	simply	that	Kracauer’s	consciousness	neglects	to	mount	a	critique	of	reification;	on	the	contrary,	it	was	itself	a	venue	for	the	collection	and	custody	of	objects	–	it	was,	that	is,	a	‘storehouse’.	This	storehouse	is	in	some	ways	a	lonely	one,	but	it	is	nevertheless	supplied	with	the	alluring	objects	that	human	society	has	discarded	and	disdained,	like	yesteryear’s	unfashionable	knick-knacks.16	In	fact,	the	hint	of	childhood	recollection	in	this	passage	is	striking.	The	fear	of	abandonment	is	counterbalanced,	first	of	all,	by	the	somewhat	furtive	delight	at	being	let	loose	in	a	storehouse,	in	which	objects,	precisely	because	of	their	desuetude,	are	innocent	and	thus	capable	of	expiating	the	guilt	of	what	has	been	done	to	those	that	have	made	them.	Their	innocence	is	their	ignorance	of	the	purpose	meant	for	them	by	their	progenitors	and	employers.		 The	Proustian	tenor	of	Adorno’s	essay	on	Kracauer	–	the	experience	of	solace	in	objects,	the	atmosphere	of	childhood	recollection	–	perhaps	unsurprisingly,	in	view	of	my	earlier	discussion	of	‘Valéry	Proust	Museum’,	finds	its	complement	in	Adorno’s	extended	appreciation	of	Valéry’s	philosophy	of	art,	especially	as	intimated	in	the	collections	translated	as	Windstriche	and	Über	
Kunst.17	As	if	it	were	an	intensification	of	Kracauer’s	disappointed	turn	from	the	human,	Adorno	declares	that	‘Valéry’s	humanism	denounces	the	vulgar	demand	that	art	be	human’	(NL,	I,	162).	Valéry’s	humanism	–	which	rejects	the	insistence	
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that	the	human	as	it	is	should	constitute	the	measure	of	all	things	–	is	a	true	humanism.	There	is,	that	is	to	say,	a	specific	conception	of	humanity	at	work	here,	one	that	is	not	referable	to	really	existing	humanity.	Adorno	reiterates	this	point	in	Aesthetic	Theory:	art’s	‘humanity	is	incompatible	with	any	ideology	of	service	to	human	beings.	It	is	loyal	to	human	beings	only	through	inhumanity	toward	them.’	(AT,	197)18	Crucially,	it	is	Valéry’s	denunciation	of	the	insistence	that	art	be	human	that	is	central	to	the	conception	of	the	life	of	art	that	can	be	drawn	from	his	thinking.	‘Works	of	art,’	Adorno	remarks,	again	glossing	Valéry,	‘acquire	life	only	when	they	renounce	their	likeness	to	the	human’.	(NL,	I,	163)			 It	is	at	an	important	early	juncture	in	Aesthetic	Theory	that	Adorno	attempts	to	specify	quite	what	it	is	that	makes	the	life	of	art	distinct	from	human	life,	as	well	as,	for	that	matter,	from	the	life	of	natural	objects:	Although	the	demarcation	line	between	art	and	the	empirical	must	not	be	effaced,	and	least	of	all	by	the	glorification	of	the	artist,	artworks	nevertheless	have	life	sui	generis.	This	life	is	not	just	their	external	fate.	Significant	artworks	constantly	divulge	[kehren	…	hervor]	new	layers,	age,	grow	cold,	die.	It	is	a	tautology	that,	as	artifacts,	human	productions	[Hervorbringungen],	they	do	not	live	immediately	as	humans	do.	But	the	emphasis	on	the	artifactual	element	in	art	concerns	less	the	fact	that	it	is	manufactured	than	its	own	inner	constitution,	regardless	of	how	it	came	to	be.	Artworks	are	alive	in	that	they	speak	in	a	fashion	that	is	denied	to	natural	objects	and	the	subjects	who	make	them.	(AT,	4-5)19		As	we	have	seen,	the	putative	immediacy	of	human	life	is	no	guarantee	that	it	is	in	fact	all	the	more	truly	life	for	that.	What	Adorno	specifically	calls	‘immediate	life’	is,	in	fact,	held	to	be	tantamount	to	its	opposite:	‘[w]here	it	is	entirely	present,	entirely	itself,	it	reveals	itself	as	given	up	to	death.’	(Mahler,	156)		The	passage	from	Aesthetic	Theory	above	repeats	Valéry’s	injunction	against	humanism	in	art,	but	it	also	develops	Adorno’s	interpretation	to	the	effect	that	that	injunction	fosters	a	true	humanism.	In	order	to	bring	out	the	way	in	which	
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the	similarity	and	difference	between	artworks	and	human	beings	is	held	in	tension	in	this	passage,	we	may	turn	briefly,	not	to	Valéry,	but	to	Proust.	At	one	point	in	A	l’ombre	des	jeunes	filles	en	fleur,	Proust’s	narrator	is	led	into	an	‘uninhabited’	drawing-room	(where	he	is	to	wait	to	be	received	for	tea	with	Mme	Swann	and	Gilberte)	by	a	footman	who	does	not,	so	far	as	the	reader	is	told,	say	anything.	In	that	room,	the	narrator	was	‘left	in	the	company	of	orchids,	roses	and	violets	which,	like	people	who	stand	waiting	beside	you	but	do	not	know	you,	did	not	break	the	silence	[gardaient	un	silence],	which	their	individuality	as	live	things	[leur	individualité	de	choses	vivantes]	only	made	the	more	striking’.20	While	this	example	may	seem	starkly	to	contrast	with	Adorno’s	emphasis	in	the	above	quotation	on	the	difference	of	artworks	from	natural	objects	–	natural	objects	such	as	orchids,	roses,	and	violets,	perhaps	–	and	from	people	–	people	who	stand	beside	us	but	with	whom	we	are	not	acquainted,	for	example	–	it	in	fact	helps	to	bring	into	view	a	number	of	important	aspects	of	Adorno’s	argument.	First,	the	plants	are	not	‘live	things’	primarily	or,	indeed,	at	all	by	dint	of	their	natural	biological	functions.	Rather,	constitutive	of	their	life	for	Proust’s	narrator	is	their	implied	ability	to	speak,	to	break	the	silence	that,	since	in	fact	they	do	not	speak,	becomes	all	the	more	noticeable.	For	the	narrator	of	In	Search	
of	Lost	Time,	flowers	are	by	no	means	natural	objects	in	sheer	opposition	to	artworks,	and,	to	repeat,	their	life	is	characterised	not	by	mute	photosynthesis,	respiration,	pollination,	and	so	on,	but	by	the	fact	that	they	bear	meaning	(which	they	may	withhold	from	us)	in	themselves.	What	is	clear	from	the	above	passage	in	Aesthetic	Theory	is	that,	like	the	flowers	in	Mme	Swann’s	drawing-room,	artworks	have	the	capacity	to	speak,	and	it	is	this	capacity	that	constitutes	their	life.	But,	it	may	here	be	objected,	Proust’s	plants	do	not	speak	(though	it	is	felt	
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that	they	could),	whereas	Adorno’s	artworks	do	(though	what	they	say,	we	are	not	told).	Furthermore,	the	orchids,	etc.,	are	explicitly	compared	to	people,	which	would	seem	to	run	counter	to	Adorno’s	insistence	that	the	life	of	artworks	resides	in	their	ability	to	speak	in	a	way	that	is	closed	to	human	subjects.	But	the	people	in	the	passage	from	Proust	are	people	that	we	do	not	know,	who	are	closed	to	us,	prevented	by	social	convention	from	making	themselves	knowable,	and	are	thus	reduced	to	membership	in	the	amorphous	mass	of	strangers.	The	flowers	are	thus	both	modelled	on	people	in	a	society	which	erects	barriers	between	them	despite	their	physical	proximity,	inhibiting	understanding	and	even	affection,	but	at	the	same	time	they	are	nevertheless	people	that	bear	the	possibility	of	an	as	yet	undiscovered	human	encounter.	Comparably,	for	Adorno,	what	artworks	say	is	not	directly	comprehensible	–	‘[a]rtworks,’	we	are	later	informed,	‘speak	like	elves	in	fairy	tales’	(AT,	126)	–	and	concomitantly	the	life	that	they	have	as	speaking	things	is	not	one	that	we	yet	share.21	The	artwork’s	ability	to	speak	and	its	life	are	intimately	connected.22	Artworks,	as	Adorno	remarks	just	after	the	passage	quoted	above,	‘speak	by	virtue	of	the	communication	of	everything	particular	[alles	Einzelnen]	in	them’,	in	such	a	way	that	their	speaking	is	strictly	irreducible	to	what	they	say.				 It	is	in	the	speech	of	artworks	that	their	fundamental	connection	with	natural	beauty	inheres.	The	relation	between	art	objects	and	natural	objects	in	the	above	passage	from	Aesthetic	Theory	is,	however,	explicitly	disavowed.	This	disavowal	is	nevertheless	not	the	final	word	on	this	relation,	any	more	than	Adorno	holds	that	the	denial	of	the	power	of	speech	to	humans	and	natural	objects	is	final.	First,	to	be	sure,	in	claiming	that	artworks	divulge	new	layers	and	that	they	thereby	age,	Adorno	is	recollecting	a	moment	in	Hegel’s	aesthetics	in	
	 15	
which	Hegel	both	contrasts	natural	objects	with	artworks,	and	emphasises	the	status	of	art	as	a	kind	of	product	distinct	from	nature:	For	the	products	of	all	the	arts	are	works	of	the	spirit	and	therefore	are	not,	like	natural	productions,	complete	all	at	once	within	their	specific	sphere;	on	the	contrary,	they	have	a	beginning,	a	progress,	a	perfection,	and	an	end,	a	growth,	blossoming,	and	decay.23			The	contrast	is	striking	because	the	characteristics	of	growth,	blossoming,	and	decay	seem	in	fact	to	be	typical	of	natural	products	and	thence	metaphorically	transposed	to	artworks.	Hegel,	however,	rejects	that	transposition.	What	he	is	implicitly	claiming	here	is	that	growth,	blossoming,	and	decay	of	artwork	constitutes	what	they	are	as	what	they	are	(so	to	speak),	whereas	natural	growth,	etc.,	is	in	a	fundamental	sense	accidental	to	natural	productions,	which	have	an	external	relationship	to	their	coming-	and	ceasing-to-be.			 In	the	passage	in	which	he	claims	that	artworks	‘age,	grow	cold,	die’,	Adorno	is	thus	seeking	to	establish	a	distinction,	inspired	by	Hegel’s,	between	the	life	course,	so	to	speak,	of	art	and	that	of	natural	objects.	Adorno,	however,	hardly	takes	over	Hegel’s	relegation	of	natural	beauty	in	general;	on	the	contrary,	that	relegation	is	perhaps	the	chief	object	of	criticism	in	the	section	on	‘Natural	Beauty’	in	Aesthetic	Theory.	Hegel’s	deafness	to	‘the	speech	of	what	is	not	significative’	(AT,	75)	is	fatal	not	only	to	his	appreciation	of	natural	beauty,	but	moreover	to	any	understanding	of	the	relation	between	art	and	nature.	In	speaking,	artworks	are	not	merely	exercising	a	capacity	that	natural	objects	simply	do	not	have,	but	rather	‘art	wants	once	again	to	attain	what	has	become	opaque	to	humans	in	the	language	of	nature’	(AT,	77)	–	a	language	to	which	we	are	now	deaf	because	on	the	Baconian	rack,	nature	just	tells	us	what	we	think	we	want	to	hear.	Artworks	do	not,	therefore,	imitate	particular	instances	of	nature	–	
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the	miscarriage	of	most	attempts	to	do	that	is	testament	to	this	claim	–	but	rather	what	has	been	rendered	mute	in	nature	as	such.	In	a	passage	that	begins	with	an	important	formulation	for	this	essay’s	focus	on	the	relation	of	artworks	to	the	human,	Adorno	illustrates	this	point	with	the	example	of	Anton	von	Webern’s	music:	With	human	means	art	wants	to	realize	the	language	of	what	is	not	human.	The	pure	expression	of	artworks,	freed	from	every	thing-like	interference,	even	from	everything	so-called	natural,	converges	with	nature	just	as	in	Webern’s	most	authentic	works	the	pure	tone,	to	which	they	are	reduced	by	the	strength	of	subjective	sensibility,	reverses	dialectically	into	natural	sound:	that	of	an	eloquent	nature,	certainly,	its	language,	not	the	portrayal	of	a	part	of	nature.	(AT,	78)		The	distance	of	Webern’s	works	from	musical	attempts	to	capture	birdsong	or	waterfalls	emphasises	the	point	that	it	is	natural	sound,	and	not	particular	natural	sounds,	that	are	heard	in	his	music.	What	is	moreover	striking	in	the	above	passage	is	that	it	is	art	that	deploys	‘human	means’	to	realise	its	ends,	rather	than	those	means	being	employed	by	the	artist	as	such.	Hence	also	in	Webern’s	music	‘the	strength	of	subjective	sensibility’	becomes	nature.	As	we	saw	earlier,	the	artwork’s	artifactuality	means	that	it	cannot	be	said	to	live	as	human	beings	do.	It	is	central	to	Adorno’s	aesthetics	in	general	that	the	artifactuality	of	artworks	as	a	mere	marker	of	their	human	provenance	is	insignificant,	and	it	belongs	rather	to	the	artwork’s	own	constitution.	This	is	not	at	all	to	claim	that	artifactuality	itself	is	insignificant,	but	entails,	on	the	contrary,	the	centrality	of	that	feature	of	the	artwork	to	the	emergence	of	its	own	particular	life.	That	the	artwork	takes	over	its	own	artifactuality	is	thus	a	token	of	the	life	it	has	in	excess	of	human	production	of,	or	investment	in,	it.			 *	
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It	is	worth	briefly	recapping	certain	aspects	of	the	argument	I	have	been	making.	Artworks	are	alive,	for	Adorno,	and	not	by	mere	analogy	with	human	persons.	Instead,	Adorno	advocates	Valéry’s	refusal	of	the	requirement	for	art	to	be	human	and,	furthermore,	views	this	refusal	as	the	condition	of	art’s	life.	We	have	also	begun	to	see	what	art’s	life	is:	crucially,	the	life	of	art	is	mortal.		 This	insistence	on	art’s	mortality	of	course	runs	counter	to	versions	of	the	life	of	art	that	construe	it	as	duration,	where	duration	means	a	kind	of	cultural	immortality	modelled	on	bourgeois	conceptions	of	established	property.	According	to	Adorno,	art’s	primitive	connection	with	the	attempt	to	render	the	transient	durable	is	itself	‘accompanied	by	consciousness	of	its	futility,	perhaps	even	that	such	duration	[…]	was	tied	up	with	a	sense	of	guilt	toward	the	living.’	(AT,	280)	Fixation	on	durability	thus	mistakes	the	sources	of	art’s	life:	‘Confusion	occurs	between	what	a	detestable	nationalist	exhortation	once	called	the	“permanent	value	of	artworks”—everything	dead,	formal,	and	neutralized	in	them—and	the	hidden	seeds	of	survival.’	(AT,	28)24	In	this	context,	it	is	an	acute	irony	that	those	for	whom	permanent	value	is	the	measure	of	all	things,	art	included,	cannot	tolerate	long	works	of	art.	Conjuring	the	image	of	the	frequent-flier	businessman,	Adorno	remarks	that	‘those	who	have	survived	Mahler	by	fifty	years	flinch	at	his	works	as	the	habitués	of	air	travel	shrink	from	a	voyage	by	sea.’	But	what	they	are	flinching	from	is	really	their	own	accelerated	mortality:	Mahlerian	duration	reminds	them	that	they	have	themselves	lost	duration;	perhaps	they	fear	that	they	no	longer	live	at	all.	They	fend	this	off	with	the	important	man’s	superior	assertion	that	he	has	no	time,	which	lets	slip	its	own	ignominious	truth.	(Mahler,	73)		The	permanent	birthday	party	for	imperishable	cultural	goods	is	proof	against	ever	having	to	endure	an	artwork	itself.	The	demand	of	Mahlerian	duration,	and	
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of	other	works	from	which	expurgation	would	be	fatal,	that	the	work	itself	be	encountered	is	in	opposition	to	the	impulse	desires	from	artworks	simply	that	they	persist.		 But	if	the	life	of	art	is	not	chiefly	characterised	by	duration	as	such,	then	is	it	merely	fleeting?	Commenting	on	Adorno’s	contention	that	the	essay	as	form	‘tries	to	render	the	transient	eternal’,	J.M.	Bernstein	claims	that	‘[t]he	oxymoron	of	rendering	the	transient	eternal	is	figurative;	the	transient	[…]	can	have	all	the	weight,	all	the	substantiality,	all	the	objectivity	and	bindingness	that	was	once	believed	to	be	the	prerogative	of	the	necessary	and	universal.’25	Even	if	it	downplays	the	indeed	oxymoronic	intention	of	Adorno’s	statement	by	viewing	it	figuratively,	this	reading	nevertheless	rightly	emphasises	the	importance	to	Adorno	of	a	radical	re-evaluation	of	the	ephemeral.	In	the	context	of	his	aesthetics	in	particular,	Adorno	emphasises	that	the	recuperation	of	the	ephemeral	is	not	mere	extension,	but	transformation	and	recovery	in	one.	The	distinction	Adorno	draws	between	immortal	duration	and	resurrection	is	especially	important	here.	‘Only	something	that	has	been	mortal,’	he	states,	‘can	be	resurrected.’	(NL,	II,	28)	And	resurrection	is,	it	would	seem,	the	only	possible	source	of	the	life	that	Adorno	envisages	for	art,	since	duration,	by	contrast,	must	immobilise	(read:	kill)	what	it	perpetuates.	Adorno	makes	this	clear	in	the	closing	stages	of	one	of	his	essays	on	Goethe,	both	of	which,	incidentally,	address	the	meaning	of	classicizing	conceptions	of	durability	and	the	alternatives	to	them	that	emerge	in	Goethe’s	work.	Commenting	on	the	final	scene	of	Faust,	Adorno	remarks	that	‘[t]he	power	of	life,	as	a	power	of	continued	life,	is	equated	with	forgetting.	It	is	only	in	being	forgotten	and	thereby	transformed	that	anything	survives	at	all.	[…]	Hope	is	not	memory	held	fast	but	the	return	of	what	has	been	
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forgotten.’	(NL,	I,	120)	Thus	Goethe	anticipates	the	Proustian	search	for	temps	
perdu:	‘The	idea	of	immortality	is	tolerated	only	in	what	is	itself,	as	Proust	well	knew,	transient	–	in	works	of	art	as	the	last	metaphors	for	revelation	in	the	authentic	language.’	(NL,	I,	184)	Significantly,	the	remarks	on	Goethe	and	on	Proust	come	at	the	conclusions	of	their	respective	commentaries.	These	termini	are,	of	course,	the	points	at	which	Adorno	gives	up	his	own	contact	with	the	work	–	both	his	own	on	which	he	is	engaged	and	the	work	of	the	writers	he	is	in	the	process	of	discussing	–	relinquishing	his	grasp	on	it,	at	least	for	now.	It	is	at	precisely	such	moments	in	the	course	of	commentary	that	the	immortality	of	the	transient	is	liable	to	be	realized.	A	kind	of	life	that	drastically	transcends	humans	as	they	are,	and	yet	is	offered	to	them	as	the	fulfilment	of	their	humanity;	requiring	the	radical	transformation	of	the	corrupt	body,	yet	not	eschewing	the	bodily	altogether:	resurrection	is,	in	fact,	a	remarkably	apt	way	to	think	about	the	life	of	art.	The	refusal	to	be	amenable	to	humanity	on	the	part	of	art	is	the	intimation	of	a	humanity	that	might	yet	come	to	be,	by	means	of	a	refusal	to	conform	to	humanity	as	it	is.	In	its	renunciation	of	the	human,	therefore,	art	figures	forth	what	is	confected,	rejected,	and	believed	impossible	by	enlightenment	disavowals	of	myth,	a	true	anthropomorphism.																																																												1	The	epigraph	to	Part	I	of	Minima	Moralia,	‘Life	does	not	live’,	is	taken,	according	to	Adorno,	from	the	nineteenth-century	Austrian	novelist,	Ferdinand	Kürnberger.	See	
Minima	Moralia:	Reflections	from	Damaged	Life,	trans.	by	Edmund	Jephcott	(London:	Verso,	2000),	19	(hereafter	MM).	Since	Adorno	frequently	expresses	in	MM	fatigue	with	
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																																																																																																																																																														America,	the	likeliest	source	for	this	epigraph	is	Kürnberger’s	Der	Amerika-Müde:	
Amerikanisches	Kulturbild	(Frankfurt-am-Main:	Meidinger,	1855),	though	I	have	not	managed	to	find	that	precise	formulation	there.	Cf.	Adorno’s	supposition	that	it	was,	however,	with	cubism	that	art	first	recognised	that	‘life	does	not	live’.	Aesthetic	Theory,	trans.	by	Robert	Hullot-Kentor	(London:	Athlone,	1999),	301	(hereafter	AT).	
2	Translation	modified	with	reference	to	Adorno,	Gesammelte	Schriften,	ed.	by	Rolf	Tiedemann	et	al,	20	vols	in	23	(Frankfurt-am-Main:	Suhrkamp,	1970-1986),	VII	(1972),	262	(hereafter	GS	and	cited	by	volume-	and	page-number).		
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